MICHAEL BAIGENT AND RICHARD LEIGH
4
The Disappearance of the Templar Fleet
Edward II was at first loath to act at all against the Templars in his domains. When external pressures — pressures exerted by Philippe of France, by the Inquisition and by the Pope — at last compelled him to act, he acted sluggishly. The comparative apathy with which the Templar s were per secuted in England prevailed in Scotland and Ireland as well.
In Ireland, the Templar s owned at least sixteen properties, of which a minimum of six were full preceptories. They are also known to have owned at least f our castles and probably another seven. By our estimates, to administer and garrison such holdings would have necessitated a minimum presence of at least ninety men, of whom some thirty- six would have been militarily active.
On 3 February 1308 — nearly four months after the first arrests in France and a month and a half af ter the first in England — arrests began in Ireland. Altogether , some thirty member s of the Order were apprehended and taken to Dublin — approximately one- third of the total strength. There does not appear to have been any particular brutality in Ireland. Certainly there were no burnings, no executions. The Master of Ireland was released on bail, and his subordinates are believed to have been treated with comparable leniency. There are no records of any Irish Templar s having been sent to monaster ies to do penance. In Ireland, then, by 1314, vir tually the full strength of the Order would have been at large, some having escaped the initial ar rests, some having been released af ter interrogation.
Given the prolonged delay before action was taken against them, the Irish Templar s would have had ample time and opportunity to make provisions. They clear ly seem to have done so. When their lands were seized and their possessions inventoried, virtually no weapons were found. According to one historian, it is ‘ extremely surprising to find the abodes of a military order so poor ly equipped with arms’ . 1
In the main house, at Clontarf , there were only three swords. At Kilclogan, there were only two lances, an iron helm and a bow. And yet, with Edward II complaining at this time about Ir ish arms finding their way to Scotland, there was certainly no shortage of equipment in the country. It would thus seem evident that most Ir ish Templar s not only escaped ar rest, but did so with the bulk of their weaponry and equipment.
Templar Refugees
On 6 October 1309 — a full two year s af ter the first arrests in France — Edward ordered his officer s to ‘ arrest all the Templar s in Scotland who are still at large, and keep them in safe custody’ . 2 In fact, only two were ever arrested, although one of them was the Master of Scotland, Walter de Clifton. But by 1309, Edward was in no position to enforce his decrees in Scotland, most of the country then being in Bruce’ s hands. In March of that year , Bruce had been declared ruler ‘ by right of blood’ and with the ‘ consent of the said people he was chosen to be king’ . At the time of Edward’ s decree, he was fighting in Argyll. By the end of the year , he would have two- thirds of Scotland under his control, and the English garrisons at Perth, Dundee and Banf f would have to be supplied by sea.
Embroiled in his own guerrilla war against Edward, Bruce was hardly going to honour the English king’ s edicts. Nor , having been excommunicated, was he going to honour the Pope’ s — which, as we have seen, would not have been applicable in Scotland anyway. In the circumstances, Bruce would only have welcomed an influx of fugitives who were also prof essional f ighting men. And they would have been only too ready to respond by aligning themselves with his cause.
There is no record of what befell the two Templar s ar rested in Scotland. Probably they were set free. Under inter rogation, however , they testified that a number of their colleagues, including the Preceptor of Balantrodoch, ‘ threw off their habits’ and fled ‘ across the sea’ . 3 On the other hand, the trial of the Templar s in Scotland was conducted by none other than Bishop Lamberton of St Andrews. Lamber ton, as we have seen, was dextrously playing a complex double game, but his primary allegiances lay with Bruce. He was perfectly capable of acting as a recruiting officer for the per son he recognised as his country’ s rightful king. Fugitive Templar s may indeed have escaped by sea, but they could just as readily have sailed up and around Scotland to join Bruce’ s army in Argyll. Nor need they necessar ily have f led by sea at all.
It need not have been just Templars from Scotland who swelled Bruce’ s ranks. There were also, as we have seen, a sizeable number of knights at large in England who had escaped arrest. They had to go somewhere. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that at least some of them found their way to Scotland — and reasonable to suppose that some of the Irish brethren did so as well. Indeed, one English Templar , at his interrogation, declared explicitly that his colleagues had fled to Scotland. The question, really, is not whether English Templars sought a haven in the nor th, but how many of them did so.
Whatever the number , which could have been as high as ninety- three, it was in all probability augmented by fugitives from France and elsewhere on the Continent. As we have seen, the Templar s in France had sufficient advance warning of the attack upon them to make at least some provisions. Thus the treasure of the Paris preceptory disappeared, as did a number of the Order ’ s high- ranking French dignitaries, who supposedly sailed away on eighteen ships. That the Grand Master and other officials remained does not mean they were unprepared or caught off guard. It merely suggests that they had, until the last moment, every hope of averting the fate that eventually over took them — every hope, that is, of def ending the Order against the accusations levelled against it and of restor ing it to the status it had previously enjoyed.
It must be remembered that while Philippe’ s initial onslaught against the Templar s in France was swift and sudden, the process that followed was prolonged. There were to be f ive year s of legal wrangling, negotiation, intrigue, horse- trading and general dither ing before the Order was officially dissolved, and seven years before Jacques de Molay was executed. During the whole of this time, large number s of Templar s remained free, wander ing about Europe. They had abundant opportunity to make plans, coordinate their ef f or ts, organise escape routes and find a refuge.
According to extant charters, there were, at the minimum, 556 full Templar preceptories in France and countless smaller holdings as well. The Order ’ s numer ical strength in the country was at least 3200, of whom an estimated 350 were knights and 930 sergeants — a total of 1280 f ighting men. During the legal proceedings in France, Inquisition records reveal 620 Templar s to have been ar rested; if the same percentages apply, about 250 would have been f ighting men. This leaves a minimum of 1030 active military members of the Order still at large — Templar s who were never ar rested, never caught, never found.
A fair number , of course, would have remained in France. Although the account is almost certainly exaggerated, the hills around Lyons were at one point alleged to conceal more than 1500 refugee Templars — a sobering prospect for both the Inquisitor s and the French king. But if many Templar s remained in France, a sizeable number would have sought refuge abroad. Shortly after the initial arrests, for example, Imber t Blanke, Master of Auvergne, is known to have come to England, apparently to advise English brethren on how to conduct themselves during the impending legal proceedings. Eventually, Imbert was imprisoned in England, but under considerably more relaxed conditions than those his colleagues endured in France. In April 1313, he was sent from the Tower of London to the Archbishop of Canterbury for penance. A month later , he was granted a pension for his support by Edward II. There must have been many Templar s who, like Imbert, came to England, but were never detained at all. Some would have come directly across the Channel. A number , in all likelihood, would have come through Flander s, which remained sympathetic to them and maintained constant maritime traffic with the British Isles. As England, during the next seven years, became increasingly unsuitable as a refuge, the fugitives from the Continent, together with their English and Irish brethren, would have gravitated nor thwards — where, beyond the reach of both Papacy and Inquisition, they could expect immunity.
The Templar Fleet and its Escape Routes
Any mass exodus of knights, especially if it included the Order ’ s treasure as well, would almost certainly have involved the Templar fleet — that fleet which vanished so mysteriously, and about which so little is known. Indeed, the Templar f leet may hold the answer s to many of the questions surrounding the last days of the Order . It may also point to a possible Templar presence in Argyll. This is virtually unexplored territory.
By the mid- thirteenth century, the Temple’ s fleet had become not just a necessity, but a major asset. For the Templar s, as for their kindred Order , the Knights of St John, it was much cheaper to transport men, horses and matériel to the Holy Land by their own ships than to hire vessels f rom local merchants. Moreover , the fleet could be used to transport other personnel and equipment, as well as pilgrims, and this proved a lucrative source of revenue. At one point, the Templar s were car rying 6000 pilgrims a year to Palestine from their ports in Spain, France and Italy. Their ships were generally preferred to other s because they travelled with an escort of armed galleys. Then, too, the Order ‘ could be trusted not to sell their passenger s into slavery at Moslem por ts, as did cer tain merchants’ .4 And being exempt f rom customs dues, the Temple’ s ships also traf f icked extensively in such commodities as fabrics, spices, dyes, porcelain and glass. As we have seen, the Templars were licensed to export their own wool.
So active was Templar trade that the civilian shipowner s of Marseilles, as early as 1234, sought to ban the Order from their port. From this date on, both the Templars and the Hospitaller s were restricted to one ship each, which could make only two voyages a year ; they could carry as much cargo as they could hold, but no more than 1500 passenger s. Such measures, however , did not curb the mar itime activities of either Order . Both simply availed themselves of other ports.
On the whole, the Templar fleet was geared towards operations in the Mediterranean — keeping the Holy Land supplied with men and equipment, and importing commodities from the Middle East into Europe. At the same time, however , the fleet did operate in the Atlantic. Extensive trade was conducted with the Br itish Isles and, very probably, with the Baltic cities of the Hanseatic League. Thus Templar preceptor ies in Europe, especially in England and Ireland, were generally located on the coast or on navigable rivers. The primary Atlantic seaport for the Templar s was La Rochelle, which also had good over land communication with Mediterranean ports. Cloth, for example, could be brought from Britain on Templar ships to La Rochelle, transported over land to a Mediterranean port such as Collioure, then loaded aboard Templar ships again and car r ied to the Holy Land. By this means, it was possible to avoid the always risky passage through the Straits of Gibraltar , usually controlled by the Saracens.
The personnel of the Paris Temple who eluded Philippe’ s grasp are unlikely to have escaped by land, for the king’ s men had the region around Paris fairly well patrolled. (Two Templar s who did try to flee northwards were captured at Chaumont, on the upper Marne, just as they were about to leave French territory.) An over land journey all the way to the coast at La Rochelle would have been inordinately difficult, if not impossible. But while the primary Templar por t may have been La Rochelle, the Order is known to have maintained a fleet of smaller ships on the Seine, and there were, in f act, a number of Templar houses and preceptories ranged along the river , from Paris to the coast — at least twelve, including one at Rouen and one near the present site of Le Havre. Moreover , the Templar s were exempt from tolls and their ships were not subject to search. In the months immediately prior to the first arrests, therefore, both per sonnel and treasure could easily have been transported down the Seine to the coast. Here, both men and cargo would have been transf er red to larger ships sailing up f rom La Rochelle or any other por t. Even af ter the ar rests and per secution had begun, the chief escape routes f or f leeing Templar s were more likely to have been by river and sea than overland.
But where, having put out f rom French coastal por ts, would the Templar fleet have gone? It must be remembered that no records of any kind survive — and this in itself is indicative, constituting an important clue in its own right. If Philippe had caught, captured or impounded Templar ships, there would certainly be some record. Even if official documentation was censored or suppressed, public knowledge would have been widespread. Such a move could not possibly have been kept secret.
Similarly in Spain and Por tugal, a Templar landing could not have passed unnoticed. Granted, Templar s sailing from France would have been welcomed by their Spanish and Por tuguese brethren. They could have expected a cordial reception in such places as Majorca, where the Order owned the town and por t of Pollensa, as well as much other territory, and where the king, Jaime II, was friendly to them. But the seaports of Spain and Portugal were major urban and commercial centres at the time, with a thriving business life and a large civilian population. Amidst the sensation caused by the initial arrests in France, it def ies credibility that Templar ships could have put in to some such town as, say, Palma, and lef t no trace whatever on the historical record. And the Templars themselves, of course, could not afford to attract such attention.
There would, in effect, have been only three possible destinations for the Templar fleet. One, sometimes suggested by historians, would have been somewhere in the Islamic world — either in the Mediterranean or on the Atlantic coast of Nor th Africa. But circumstances argue against this. In the first place, the Templar s, in 1307, still hoped to provez themselves innocent of the charges levelled against them. To seek refuge among the ‘ infidels’ would have been tantamount to admitting the accusations of heresy and disloyalty. Moreover , it is again unlikely, if the Templar fleet found a haven under Islam, that Muslim commentator s would have left no record. It would, after all, have been a major propaganda coup. Indeed, when small enclaves of Templars in Spain and Egypt did seek refuge there and conver ted, at least nominally, to Islam, Muslim writer s made considerable capital on it. They would hardly have remained silent had the Templar fleet, as well perhaps as the Order ’ s treasure, passed into their camp.
It is sometimes suggested that the Templar fleet might have sought safety in Scandinavia. As we have noted, the two Templars interrogated in Scotland claimed that their brethren escaped by sea, and this has led some historians to assume they went to Denmark, Sweden or , most likely, Norway. Such a possibility cannot be altogether discounted, but it is highly improbable. Scandinavia’ s population was minuscule at the time, and it would have been difficult to escape notice in any inhabited area. The Templars had no preceptories there, no base from which to operate, no ties, commercial or political, with either people or governments. And af ter the Order was officially dissolved in 1310, they would have been as liable to arrest and persecution in Scandinavia as elsewhere. Again, too, one would expect there to be some record.
Nevertheless, the fastnesses of the Norse wilderness — no wor se, after all, than the regions ‘ colonised’ by the Teutonic Knights — would have provided a refuge of sor ts. It might even have appeared attractive if there had been no alternative. But there was an alternative. There was Scotland, a country with whom the Templar s already maintained cordial relations, a country whose acknowledged king had been excommunicated, and, what’ s more, a country crying out for allies, especially trained fighting men. Had the knights sought to devise or contrive an ideal refuge of their own, they could not possibly have done better than Scotland.
Edward’ s fleet, based on the east coast of England, effectively blocked the established trade routes between Flander s and Scottish ports such as Aberdeen and Inverness. Templar ships, moving northwards from La Rochelle or from the mouth of the Seine, could not have risked negotiating the Channel and the Nor th Sea. Neither could they have proceeded through the Irish Sea, which was also effectively blocked by English naval vessels based at Ayr and at Carrickfergus in Belfast Lough. But one impor tant route was open — from the nor th coast of Ireland, including the mouth of the Foyle at Londonderry, to Bruce’ s domains in Argyll, Kintyre and the Sound of Jura. Bruce’ s close friend and ally, Angus Og MacDonald of Islay, held Islay, Jura and Colonsay, which secured a direct route between nor th- western Ulster and south- western Scotland. This was the route which for some time had been supplying Bruce with arms and equipment.
If large contingents of Templar s from the Continent, and/or par ts of the Templar fleet itself , found refuge in Scotland, they can only have done so by this route — from Donegal, f rom the Foyle, from the nor thwest coast of Ulster to the Sound of Jura and its environs. But how could a Templar f leet obtain access to this route without negotiating the Irish Sea and risking interception by English ships?
We tend today to think of Ireland as one of the British Isles, whose primary centre is Dublin and whose main ports, except for one or two in the south, are on the east coast, facing the Ir ish Sea and the British ‘ mainland’ . This, certainly, has been the case since the seventeenth century, but it was not so in the Middle Ages and bef ore. In Bruce’ s time, Ireland’ s primary commerce was not with England, but with the Continent. In consequence, Dublin and other such eastern ports were insignificant compared to the major southern harbours in the counties of Wexford, Waterford and Cork. More important still, the west of Ireland, now seen as a remote, denuded and depopulated hinterland, contained at least two ports of genuinely major proportions — Limerickand, most crucial of all, Galway. Limerick and Galway were thriving cities during the Middle Ages, maintaining a booming trade not only with France, but with Spain and North Africa as well. Indeed, some old maps depict Ireland as lying closer to Spain than to England. The trade routes running to Galway from Spain, and from such French coastal centres as Bordeaux and La Rochelle, were as busy and well established as any of the period. From Galway, the route continued northwards, around the coast of Donegal, past the mouth of the Foyle and what today is Londonder ry, to the west coast of Scotland. This, almost certainly, would have been the route taken by any escaping Templar ships. It was a safe, convenient and familiar route, and the English fleet had no way of cutting it.
As we have noted, modern sites in the British Isles bearing the prefix ‘ Temple’ are recognised by historians as having formerly been Templar proper ty. As we have also noted, the Templars, given their considerable maritime and commercial activity, tended to build their major installations on the coast or on navigable rivers. Thus, for example, Maryculter in Scotland was on the Dee, Balantrodoch and Temple Liston were on the Firth of For th. In England, Temple Thornton was on the Tyne, Westerdale on the Esk, Faxfleet on the Humber , and there were extensive port facilities at London, Dover and Bristol. Ir ish records are decidedly more sketchy, many of them undoubtedly having been lost or destroyed in the upheavals of the ensuing centuries; and in the west of Ireland, where much of the population spoke Gaelic until the twentieth century, the kind of documentation found elsewhere may never have been compiled. Such records as do exist f or Ireland display a pattern similar to the kind prevailing elsewhere in the British Isles, with Templar preceptories and installations being sited on the coast or on navigable rivers. But these records show the concentration of Templar holdings to have been along the east coast, from Ulster , to the main base of Clontar fat Dublin, down through Kilcloggan and Templebryan, to Cork. The primary known exception is Limerick, where the Order also had substantial holdings.
What of the west? Nothing is ever said about it, because no one appears to know anything about it. We, however , discovered no fewer than seven additional sites on the nor th- west coast of Ireland which are not mentioned in any charter , but which, on the basis of all available evidence, do appear to have been Templar . In modern- day Donegal, there is Templecrone near the Isle of Aran and Templecavan on the Malin peninsula. There is Templemoyle near Greencastle on the Foyle. Slightly inland f rom Donegal Bay are Templehouse, Templerushin and Templecarne. Further inland still, there is Templedouglas. And there may have been an installation of the Order at Lifford, in what today is County Tyrone, just nor th of Strabane. None of these sites appears to have had any particular religious significance, either Christian or preChristian, which might explain the ‘ Temple’ pref ix. At most of them, there are ruined chapels of medieval date. Everything indicates that they, too, were formerly Templar holdings. They would not have appeared in the records because they were so isolated from what were then (and in some cases still are) major population centres. Indeed, the ecclesiastical and secular author ities of the time—the Pope in Avignon, Philippe in Paris and Edward in London — may not even have known of their existence. And yet they would have conformed to the established Templar pattern of building: they would have provided valuable por ts of call; and they would have guarded the trade routes.
From all this, it would appear that the Templar fleet, escaping the clutches of the French king, would most likely have made its way up the west and round the nor th coast of Ireland. Very possibly, it made a number of land fallsen route to pick up arms, equipment and perhaps other fugitive brethren. Once having reached the vicinity of the Foyle, the refugees would have been safe in territory held by Bruce’ s allies. And from the Foyle and the coast of western Ulster , there would have been a direct connection with the established route whereby arms were smuggled to Argyll under the auspices and protection of Angus Óg MacDonald. Thus Templar ships, Templar arms and matériel, Templar fighting men and, just possibly, the Templar treasure would have found their way to Scotland, providing vital reinforcements and resources for Bruce’ s cause.
Legends of Templar Survival
Writing in the mid- nineteenth century, one historian of the Templars states, perhaps a trifle more definitively than can be justified:
Many [Templar s], however , were still at large, having successfully evaded capture by obliterating all marks of their previous profession, and some had escaped indisguise to the wild and mountainous par ts of Wales, Scotland and Ireland. 5
At the end of the century, another histor ian wr ites:
The Templar s . . . perhaps found a refuge in the little army of the excommunicated King Robert, whose fear of off ending the French monarch would doubtless be vanquished by his desire to secure a few capable men- atarms as recruits. 6
And a modern histor ian, wr iting in 1972, is even more precise:
All but two Scottish brethren escaped; shrewd politicians, they may well have found refuge with the Bruce’ s guerrillas — certainly King Rober t never legally ratif ied the Scottish Temple’ s dissolution. 7
Masonic histor ians, and Masonically or iented wr iter s, are more explicit still, and more precise in their claims. Thus:
. . . we are told . . . that having deserted the Temple, they ranged themselves under the banners of Robert Bruce, and fought with him at Bannockburn . . . Legend states that after the decisive battle of Bannockburn . . . Bruce, in return for their eminent services, formed these Templar s into a new body.8
And again:
In 1309 when per secutions began, an inquisition was held at Holyrood, only two knights appeared, the other s were legitimately occupied in the fighting, having joined Bruce’ s army, which was marching against the English. 9
Whether such statements as the latter two, issuing as they do from Masonic sources, are drawing on ver if iable information as well as legend is uncer tain. In any case, there is no question that legends of a Templar survival in Scotland abound. In fact, there are at least two distinct bodies of legend.
One of these was first promulgated, or at least f ir st broke the surface of history, through the activities of an important eighteenth- century Freemason, Baron Karl von Hund, and the Masonic r ite deriving from him — a rite known as the Strict Observance, which purported to be a ‛restoration’ of the Order of the Temple. According to the Strict Observance, Pier re d’ Aumont, Preceptor of Auvergne, together with seven knights and two other preceptors, fled France around 1310, escaping first to Ireland and then, two year s later , to Scotland — more specifically, to the island of Mull. On Mull, they are said to have joined forces with a number of other Templar s, presumably refugees from England and Scotland, led by a preceptor whose name is cited as George Harris, formerly an officer of the Order at Caburn and Hampton Cour t; and under the joint auspices of Harris and Pier re d’ Aumont, a resolution was made to perpetuate the institution. A list of Templar Grand Master s which Baron von Hund produced shows Pierre d’ Aumont succeeding Jacques de Molay. 10
In Part III of this book, we will examine in detail the plausibility of these assertions, as well as the specific historical context from which they arose and in which they must be placed. We will assess Hund’ s own credibility and that of the sources from which he claimed to have obtained his inf ormation. For the moment, it will be sufficient simply to comment on some of the details in the Strict Observance account.
In cer tain respects, at any rate, the details are not just unreliable, but demonstrably wrong. For example, the Str ict Observance declares Pierre d’ Aumont to have been Preceptor of Auvergne. In fact, however , the Preceptor of Auvergne was not Pier re d’ Aumont, but Imbert Blanke, who, as we have seen, fled to England in 1306 and got himself arrested. Moreover , it is most improbable that refugee Templars could have found a haven on the island of Mull. Mull, at the time, was owned and occupied by Alexander McDougall of Lorn, one of Edward II’ s allies and Bruce’ s f iercest adversaries. Even after Bruce def eated him, he would have had numerous sympathisers on Mull, who would not have been reticent about clandestine Templar activity on the island.
On the other hand, there we re two sites owned by Bruce’ s allies where fugitive Templar s could indeed have found a refuge, or , at any rate, a saf e way- station on their travels. One of these provided a br ief refuge for Bruce himself during adverse phases of his campaigns and contained a strongly garrisoned castle which remained unswervingly loyal to him. And both sites were strategically situated on the crucial maritime route between Ulster and Bruce’ s supply bases in Argyll. These sites were the Mull of Kintyre and the Mull of Oa.
The Strict Observance account may thus be erroneous in some of its particulars, but it is easy to see how such misconceptions could have occurred. On his own admission, Hund heard his account from Scottish informants. Details could well have been garbled in the course of some f our and a half centur ies. They would almost certainly have been garbled further by transmission and translation. If a modern Englishman can confuse the island of Mull with the Mull of Kintyre or the Mull of Oa, such confusion is all the more under standable on the part of an eighteenth- century German nobleman, knowing nothing of Scottish geography and conf ronted by a welter of data not even in his own tongue. While the Strict Observance account, theref ore, may indeed be mistaken in particular s, its general tenor is eminently plausible. One especially telling detail is the asser tion that the fugitive Templars went first to Ireland. This, as we have seen, rings emphatically true; and there would have been no need to include it in a fabricated story.
The second legend of Templar survival f ir st appeared in France around 1804, more than half a century after Hund. Under the Napoleonic regime, an individual named Bernard- Raymond Fabré- Palaprat produced a charter purporting to date from 1324, ten years after the execution of Jacques de Molay. If this charter is to be believed, Jacques, shortly before his death, left instructions f or the perpetuation of the Order . To succeed him as Grand Master , he supposedly nominated one of the Templar s lef t behind on Cyprus, a Palestinian- born Christian named John Mark Larmenius. On the basis of the so- called ‘ Larmenius Char ter ’ , Fabré- Palaprat created (or made public) a non-Masonic, neo- chivalric institution, the Ancient and Sovereign Military Order of the Temple of Jerusalem, which is still in existence today. According to unconfirmed statements by its present member s, the ‛Larmenius Char ter ’ , though first made public in 1804, was already in circulation a century before, in 1705, and Fabré- Palaprat’ s Order is said to date its reconstitution f rom then. 11
We our selves cannot confirm or refute the veracity of the ‘ Larmenius Char ter ’ . For our purposes, it is of interest primar ily because of one statement it contains: ‛I, lastly . . . will say and order that the ScotTemplar s deserters of the Order , be blasted by an anathema.’ 12 This single fulmination is interesting, indeed provocative, and perhaps revealing. If the ‘ Larmenius Charter ’ is authentic, and does in fact date f rom the f our teenth century, the fulmination would seem to confirm the survival of Templar fugitives in Scotland. It suggests further that these fugitives adopted a position opposed to Larmenius and his entourage, who, one gathers, sought exoneration from all charges and some species of reconciliation with the Church. But if , as is more likely, the ‘ Larmenius Char ter ’ dates from later — from the eighteenth or nineteenth century — it suggests some violent antipathy to the asser tions promulgated by Hund and Strict Observance Freemasonry. Or to some other known Templar institution surviving in Scotland at that time.
Whatever the validity of the legends, there is, as we have seen, no question that at least some Templars found their way to Scotland, while other s, already in the country, were never caught. The only real question is how many remained at large. Ultimately, however , even the precise number s do not matter . The point is that the Templars, however numerous or few they might have been, were trained fighting men — the best f ighting men of their age, the acknowledged master s of warfare. Scotland was a kingdom desperately struggling for her independence, for the survival of her national and cultural identity. What was more, she lay under Papal interdict and her king was excommunicate. In such circumstances, Bruce would obviously have welcomed whatever help he could get; and such help as the Templars could offer would have been more than welcome. As seasoned veterans, they would have been invaluable in training the Scottish soldiery, in inculcating discipline, in imparting professionalism to men pitted against a numerically superior and better equipped foe. Their expertise in broader strategy and logistics would have been vital. Whether they actually comprised the ‘ fresh force’ that intervened so decisively at Bannockburn will probably never be known. But they need not actually have comprised it. A handful of them would have been suf f icient to lead it, and it would still have produced the effect it did on the English army.
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