THE
HISTORY OF AL-TABARI
AN
ANNOTATED TRANSLATION
VOLUME
VII
The
Foundation of the Community
Muhammad
At Al-Madina
A.D.
622-626/HIJRAH-4 A.H.
The History of al-Tabari
Editorial Board
Ihsan Abbas, University of Jordan, Amman
C. E. Bosworth, The University of Manchester
Jacob Lassner, Wayne State University, Detroit
Franz Rosenthal, Yale University
Ehsan Yar-Shater, Columbia University ( General Editor )
SUNY
SERIES IN NEAR EASTERN STUDIES
Said Amir Arjomand, Editor
Bibliotheca Persica
Edited by Ehsan Yar-Shater
The
History of al-Tabari
(Ta'rikh
al-rusul wa'1-muluk)
Volume
vii
The
Foundation of
The
Community
translated
and annotated
by
W.
Montgomery Watt
University
of Edinburgh, Emeritus
and
M.
V. McDonald
University
of Edinburgh
State
University of New York Press
The preparation of this volume was made possible by a
grant from the Program for Research Tools and Reference Works
of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent
federal agency; and in part by the Persian Heritage Foundation.
Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany
• 1987 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in
critical articles and reviews.
For information, contact State University of New York Press,
Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Tabari, 838?-923.
The foundation of the community.
(The history of al-Tabari = Ta’rikh al-rusul
wa’l-muluk; v. 7) (Bibliotheca Persica)
Translation of extracts from: Ta’rikh al-rusul
wa-al-muluk.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Islamic Empire — History — 622-661. 2. Medina
(Saudi Arabia)— History. I. Watt, W. Montgomery
(William Montgomery) II. McDonald, M. V. (Michael V.)
III. Title. IV. Series: Tabari, 838?-923.
Ta’rikh al-rusul wa-al-muluk. English; v. 7.
V. Series: Bibliotheca Persica (Albany, N.Y.)
DS38.1.T322513 1987 909'. 097671 87-12940
ISBN 0-88706-344-6
ISBN 0-88706-345-4 (pbk.)
10 98763432
Acknowledgements
In 1971 the General Editor proposed to the UNESCO to
include a translation of al-Tabari's History in its Collection
of Representative Works. UNESCO agreed, but the Commission
in charge of Arabic works favored other priorities.
Deeming the project worthy, the Iranian Institute of Translation
and Publication, which collaborated with UNESCO,
agreed to undertake the task. After the upheavals of 1979,
assistance was sought from the National Endowment for the
Humanities. The invaluable encouragement and support of
the Endowment is here gratefully acknowledged.
The General Editor wishes to thank sincerely also the participating
scholars, who have made the realization of this
project possible; the Board of Editors for their selfless assistance;
Professor Franz Rosenthal for his many helpful suggestions
in the formulation and application of the editorial
policy; Professor Jacob Lassner for his painstaking and meticulous
editing; and Dr. Susan Mango of the National Endowment
for the Humanities for her genuine interest in the
project and her advocacy of it.
Preface
f
The History of Prophets and Kings ( Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-
muluk ) by Abu Ja c far Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari (839-923),
here
rendered as the History of al-Tabari, is by common consent the
most important universal history produced in the world of Islam.
It
has been translated here in its entirety for the first time for
the benefit
of non- Arabists, with historical and philological notes for those
interested in the particulars of the text.
Tabari's monumental work explores the history of the ancient na-
tions, with special emphasis on biblical peoples and prophets, the
legendary and factual history of ancient Iran, and, in great
detail, the
rise of Islam, the life of the Prophet Muhammad, and the history
of
the Islamic world down to the year 91$. The first volume of this
translation will contain a biography of al-Tabari and a discussion
of
the method, scope, and value of his work. It will also provide
infor-
mation on some of the technical considerations that have guided
the
work of the translators.
The History has been divided here into 38 volumes, each of which
covers about two hundred pages of the original Arabic text in the
Leiden edition. An attempt has been made to draw the dividing
lines
between the individual volumes in such a way that each is to some
Preface
• » •
vm
degree independent and can be read as such. The page numbers of
the original in the Leiden edition appear on the margins of the
translated volumes.
Al-Tabari very often quotes his sources verbatim and traces the
chain of transmission [isnad] to an original source. The chains of
transmitters are, for the sake of brevity, rendered by only a dash
( — )
between the individual links in the chain. Thus, According to Ibn
Humayd — Salamah — Ibn Ishaq means that al-Tabari received the
report from Ibn Humayd who said that he was told by Salamah, who
said that he was told by Ibn Ishaq, and so on. The numerous subtle
and important differences in the original Arabic wording have been
disregarded.
The table of contents at the beginning of each volume gives a
brief
survey of the topics dealt with in that particular volume. It also
includes
the headings and subheadings as they appear in al-Tabari's
text, as well as those occasionally introduced by the translator.
Well-known place-names, such as, for instance, Mecca, Baghdad,
Jerusalem, Damascus, and the Yemen, are given in their English
spellings. Less common place-names, which are the vast majority,
are transliterated. Biblical figures appear in the accepted
English
spelling. Iranian names are usually transcribed according to their
Arabic forms, and the presumed Iranian forms are often discussed
in
the footnotes.
Technical terms have been translated wherever possible, but
some, such as dirham and imam, have been retained in Arabic forms.
Others that cannot be translated with sufficient precision have
been
retained and italicized as well as footnoted. .
The annotation aims chiefly at clarifying difficult passages, identifying
individuals and place-names, and discussing textual difficulties.
Much leeway has been left to the translators to include in the
footnotes whatever they consider necessary and helpful.
The bibliographies list all the sources mentioned in the annotation.
The index in each volume contains all the names of persons and
places referred to in the text, as well as those mentioned in the
notes
Preface
IX
as far as they refer to the medieval period. It does not include
the
names of modern scholars. A general index, it is hoped, will
appear
after all the volumes have been published.
Ehsan Yar-Shater
Contents
Acknowledgments / v
Preface / vii
Translator's Foreword / xv
The Events of the Year i (622-623) / 1
The First Friday Prayer / 1
The Sermon of the Messenger of God at the First Friday
Prayer / 2
The Choice of a Site for Mosque and House / 4
Deaths and Minor Events / 5
The Marriage with 'A'ishah / 6
Further Reports Concerning This / 8
Muslim Women Brought to Medina / 8
Prayers of Travellers / 9
Births / 9
Expedition Led by Hamzah / 10
Expedition Led by 'Ubayadah / 10
Expedition Led by Sa’d b. Abi Waqqas In
Expedition Led by Muhammad to al-Abwa' / 11
Further Details About Expeditions / 12
Expeditions Led by Muhammad / 13
Affair of Abu Qays / 14
Contents
« •
Xll
The Events of the Year 2 (623-624) / 15
Expeditions Led by the Messenger of God / 15
'All and the Name Abu Turab / 16
A Variant Account / 17
'All Marries Fatimah / 18
Expedition to Nakhlah / 18
Questions After the Return to Medina / 20
Expedition of Nakhlah — Another Account / 21
Further Details About the Expedition of Nakhlah / 22
Other Events of the Second Year of the Hijrah / 24
The Change of Qiblah / 24
Arrangements About Fasting / 2 $
The Battle of Badr — the Date / 26
The Account of the Greater Battle of Badr in the Letter of
'Urwah / 28
Another account / 32
Account of Badr by Ibn Ishaq / 34
The Dream of 'Atikah, and the Relief Force / 35
The Number of Muslims at Badr / 38
The Advance of the Muslims to Badr / 40
Abu Sufyan Takes Evasive Action / 44
The Advance of Quraysh /4s
Preparations and Discussions of Quraysh / 48
The Fighting Begins / 52
Abu Jahl and Other Meccan Dead / 61
The Division of the Booty / 63
The Return of the Muslims to Medina / 64
News of Defeat Reaches Mecca / 67
The Treatment of the Captives / 69
The Release of Zaynab's Husband / 73
Zaynab's Journey to Medina / 75
The Conversion of Abu al-'As / 76
The Conversion of 'Umayr b. Wahb / 78
Discussions About the Lawfulness of Taking Captives / 80
The Campaign Against the Banu Qaynuqa' / 85
Celebration of the First 'Id al-Adha / 87
Minor Expeditions — Dating / 88
Contents
The Expedition of al-SawIq (the Barley-Meal) / 89
Other Events of the Year / 91
The Events of the Year 3 (624-623) / 93
The Story of Ka'b b. al-Ashraf / 94
The Expedition to al-Qaradah / 98
The Killing of Abu Rafi' the Jew / 99
The Prophet Marries Hafsah / 105
The Expedition to Uhud / 10$
The Fighting Begins / 113
The Muslims Retreat / 120
Mutilation of the Muslim Dead / 129
Various Accounts Concerning Uhud / 134
The Expedition of Hamra' al-Asad / 138
The Sons of 'All / 142
The Events of the Year 4 (623-626) / 143
The Expedition of al-Raji' / 143
The Mission of 'Amr b. Umayyah Against Abu
Sufyan / 147
Muhammad's Marriage to Zaynab bt. Khuzaymah / 150
The Story of Bi'r Ma'unah / 1 5 1
The Expulsion of the Banu al-Nadir / 156
Other Events / 161
The Expedition of Dhat al-Riqa' / 161
The Expedition of al-Sawiq (or Badr al-Maw'id) / 165
Other Events / 167
Abbreviations / 168
Bibliography of Cited Works / 169
Index / 171
Translator's Foreword
$
This volume deals with the history of the Islamic co mmuni ty at
Medina between the Hijrah and the end of year 4 A.H. This was a
time of critical importance both for Islam as a religion and for
the
political community in which it was embodied. Muhammad and
those Meccan Muslims who chose to accompany him (the Emigrants)
took up their residence in Medina on the basis of the
agreement known as the Constitution of Medina. The document
of this name preserved by Ibn Hisham is probably of a later date
but appears to incorporate the essential provisions of the
original
agreement. 1 It was an agreement to form a federation for mutual
support between the "clan" of Emigrants with Muhammad as
their chief and eight clans of Medina. The federation was conceived
on traditional Arab lines; however, because the nine clans
were Muslims and Muhammad was recognized as Messenger of
God, it was in effect an Islamic polity, even though it contained
Jewish groups as secondary members. Muhammad had no special
political authority, but it was stated that serious disputes were
to
be referred to him. Since this body politic was a new venture for
all concerned and details of organization would be somewhat
fluid, many decisions must have been taken in these early years;
2. IH, 34 x *4; see also Watt, Medina , 221-8, text and
discussion; further discussion and analysis by R.B. Serjeant in Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, xli (1978), 1-42.
xvi The Foundation of the Community
but al-Tabari gives only a few glimpses of such matters, presumably
because there were no specific datable events connected with
them.
The first Friday prayer (1256-8) (pages 1256-8 of the Leiden edition)
It was important not only to make political arrangements for
the co mmuni ty of Muslims but also to establish its religious
observances. The unanimous testimony of the sources is that
Muhammad and the Muslims at Mecca did not make anything
special of the Friday midday prayer before the Hijrah. However,
there may have been some observance at Medina, and it is to be
noted that al-Tabari says it was the first Friday prayer which
Muhammad himself observed. Friday had become a market day
in Medina, probably at first to enable Jews to lay in provisions
for
the sabbath; but it was also observed by the Arabs. It was doubtless
because of these facts that the Muslims of Medina had made
something special of the Friday prayer, and Muhammad was
ready to accept their practice. Indeed, it was eventually made
obligatory for adult male Muslims to be present on this occasion
in the mosque, preferably the jami' or central mosque of the
town. 2
Details of other liturgical arrangements are mentioned on
pages 9 and 24-6.
The sermon or khutbah is an essential feature of the Friday
prayer. It seems unlikely that the sermon given here by al-Tabari
was actually delivered by Muhammad on this occasion. One of
the verses quoted (8.42) is generally held to have been revealed
over a year later at the time of the battle of Badr, while Muhammad
himself would hardly have used the phrase "I bear witness
that Muhammad is his servant and Messenger." A different sermon
is reproduced by Ibn Hisham for this occasion.
The choice of a site for mosque and house (1258-60)
From other references it is clear that what was built at this
time was a house or series of apartments for Muhammad and his
dependants. The mosque was the courtyard of the private dwelling,
2. See art. Djum'a (S.D.Goitein) in EP.
Translator’s Foreword xvii
perhaps demarcated by a wall. The "building" of the
mosque
at Quba’ was probably no more than marking off a piece of ground
with a wall or fence. At this time Muhammad had only one wife,
Sawdah bt. Zam'ah, the widow of a Muslim who had died in
Abyssinia, since 'A’ishah still lived with her parents; he had
also
two unmarried daughters in his household. 3 Accommodation
would be required for these and also, after the consummation of
her marriage, for 'A’ishah. Later when Muhammad had several
wives, each had her own apartment opening off the courtyard,
and he spent his nights with them in turn.
The choice of a site belonging to the Banu al-Najjar was probably
deliberate. Muhammad was aware that one of the reasons for
his invitation to Medina was that people hoped he would be able
to put an end to the blood*feuds which had been increasing in violence;
and he was careful not to ally himself by marriage with any
of the clans of Medina. Al-Najjar was a numerous but not particularly
powerful clan, divided into several subclans. The fact that
Muhammad had as great-grandmother a woman of al-Najjar,
Salma bt. 'Amr, could have been the justification for his decision
to live among them. They were also in a fairly central position.
Various deaths (i26of.)
About Kulthum b. Hidm nothing else appears to be known.
The three men mentioned at the end were prominent Meccan pagans
of the older generation.
As'ad b. Zurarah was one of the first group of six men from
Medina to contact Muhammad, probably in 620, and he also
made both the First Pledge of al-'Aqabah in 621 and the Second in
622. He is further credited with being mainly responsible for the
conversion of some of the leading men of Medina to Islam; and it
was he who, in the year before the Hijrah, had given hospitality
to
Muhammad’s envoy to Medina, Mus'ab b. 'Umayr. 4 His death
must have been a serious loss for Muhammad. The remark that it
is bad for the Jews and Hypocrites implies that it will discourage
them from believing in God.
At the second meeting at al-'Aqabah, when the Muslims of
3. See 1263 below.
4. 1 H, 286-93.
xviii The Foundation of the Community
Medina had pledged themselves to defend and protect Muhammad
and the Emigrants, Muhammad had asked for twelve nuqaba'
or representatives to be appointed, perhaps as a kind of
council or senate for Medina. The men selected were the leading
men in each clan of those present. As'ad b. Zurarah was the representative
of al-Najjar. Though the names of the men are re-
corded, there is no record of them having met or decided anything.
Muhammad's decision to become himself the replacement
for As'ad may have been made to prevent ill feeling between different
sections of the clan, and he may also have realized, now
that he had firsthand experience of conditions in Medina, that the
institution of nuqaba' was not going to serve any useful purpose.
The marriage with 'A'ishah (1261-3)
All Muhammad's marriages and those he arranged for his
daughters were made for political reasons. Abu Bakr was his chief
lieutenant and aide, and he is reputed to have had an excellent
knowledge of the inner politics of the nomadic tribes; thus, he
was able to advise Muhammad in his dealings with those tribes.
Muhammad's betrothal to Abu Bakr's daughter 'A’ishah was
made despite her tender age in order to cement the relationship
between the two men. Muhammad was similarly married in 625
to Hafsah, the daughter of his other prominent lieutenant 'Umar;
she was then eighteen, and her first husband had been killed at
Badr. 5 Another important Emigrant, 'Uthman b. 'Affan, later the
third caliph, was married first at Mecca to Muhammad's daughter
Ruqayyah, and then, after her death at the time of the battle of
Badr, to another daughter, Umm Kulthum. 6 What seems properly
to be a betrothal was apparently called a marriage by the Arabs,
as may be seen in the case of Muhammad's daughters and the
two sons of Abu Lahab. 7 The mention of the special features in
'A’ishah may have been circulated to offset the extravagant praise
by Shi'ites of Muhammad's daughter Fatimah. According to the
ideas of the times, the age of nine was seemingly not too young
for marriage.
5. See 1383 below.
6. See 1358 and 1373 below.
7. See 1347 below.
Translator’s Foreword
xxx
The early expeditions (1265-73)
One of the outstanding features of the period between the Hijrah
and the death of Muhammad was a long series of "expeditions"
of a warlike character. In a sense, these grew out of the nomadic
custom of the razzia, the sudden raid in which one tried
with superior force to surprise an enemy and drive off his camels.
Al-Waqidi's main surviving work on the career of Muhammad is
called "The Expeditions" ( al-Maghazi ], and expeditions
provide
the main structure of the Shah of Ibn Ishaq. The term, which is
used in English for several Arabic words, has a wide range of application;
it may be used for the action of a single individual, for
an expedition that is mainly a battle (like Badr or Uhud), for a
defensive
battle (like the siege of Medina), or for a three-month ex-
pedition with thirty thousand men (to Tabuk).
Not surprisingly, there is some uncertainty about the dating
and order of the earliest relatively small expeditions. Three
small
expeditions led by Emigrants are placed by al-Waqidi in year 1
and by Ibn Ishaq in year 2. Al-Tabari's arrangement is somewhat
curious. He first gives an account of these three expeditions
based
mainly on al-Waqidi, and then, after remarking that Ibn Ishaq
places them in year 2, proceeds to give the latter's account of an
expedition led by Muhammad and two of the previous three. He
follows this with Ibn Ishaq's account of three further expeditions
led by Muhammad himself, which according to both sources are
in year 2. Yet all this comes under the heading of year 1, which
closes with a paragraph based on al-Waqidi about Abu Qays b. al-
Aslat. Year 2 opens with a version from al-Waqidi of the four expeditions
led by Muhammad. A table in al-Waqidi's order and
with his dating may make the arrangement clearer.
Month/year
Destination
Leader
References in T
9/1
Sif al-Bahr
•
Hamzah
1265 : 1267-8
10/1
Rabigh/Ahya'
'Ubaydah
1265 : 1267
11/1
al-Kharrar
Sa'd
1265-6 : 1270
2/2
al-Abwa'/Waddan
Muhammad
«
1266 : 1270
3/2
Buwat
•
n
1268 : 1270- 1
3/2
Safawan
ft
1269-70 : 1271
6/2
al-*Ushayrah
ft
1268-9 : 1271
XX
The Foundation of the Community
The question of years could be tidied up if the paragraph about
Abu Qays were placed immediately after al-Waqidi's accounts of
the three Emigrant expeditions, and if the heading for year 2 were
inserted at this point. From the middle of page 1266, the events
belong to year 2 apart from that one paragraph.
Some further points may be noted about these expeditions. All
except that of Safawan, which was punitive, seem to have had the
aim of intercepting a Meccan caravan and gaining booty. All,
however, were unsuccessful. Sometimes the Muslim force may
have been too weak to have any prospect of success against the
men conducting the caravan. On the other hand, Muhammad had
two hundred men for the expedition of Buwat, and there were
only one hundred Meccans with the caravan of twenty-five hundred
camels. In light of the new strategy which led to the success
of the expedition of Nakhlah (sending out a party with sealed orders),
it seems that the earlier failures were due to the ability of
the Meccans to gain information from Medina; they doubtless
had agents who gave them prior notice of Muslim plans, so that
they could either increase the party with the caravan or vary the
route.
It is also to be noted that none but Emigrants took part in these
early expeditions. Before he encouraged his Meccan followers to
join him in making the Hijrah, Muhammad must have considered
how they would make their living at Medina. They could
hardly expect to be permanent guests of the Ansar, the Muslims
of Medina, and they probably had no inclination to become farmers,
though land seems to have been available. They had some expertise
in trade with Gaza and Damascus, but attempts to trade
would almost certainly lead to conflict with the Meccans. Therefore,
the intercepting of Meccan caravans and disrupting of Mec-
can trade must have been seen at least as a possibility. The Ansar
presumably acquiesced in these expeditions of Emigrants, but too
much reliance should not be placed on the statements that such
and such a person (often one of the Ansar) was left in charge of
Medina in Muhammad's absence, since it is unlikely that at this
period Muhammad himself was in any sense in charge of Medina.
Translator’s Foreword
xxi
The expedition of Nakhlah (1273-9)
Although only eight men, or at most twelve, took part in this
expedition, it was an important stage in the worsening of relations
between the Muslims and the pagan Meccans. It was the
first occasion on which a Meccan was killed by a Muslim and the
first occasion on which the Muslims seized Meccan goods.
The first point to be noted is that the party was sent out eastwards
for two days' march, but the sealed orders given to the
leader told them to proceed south from there to Batn Nakhlah on
the road from al-Ta’ if to Mecca. The exact location is not known,
but it must have been to the southeast of Mecca, and the members
of the expedition were obviously going to be in considerable
danger. All the Muslims professed themselves ready to carry on,
but at some point two remained behind the rest of the party, allegedly
looking fot a straying camel; but this sounds like an excuse.
It is not clear whether Muhammad knew there would be a
caravan at this date making for Mecca or merely thought it a
probability. The Muslim party did meet a small caravan, probably
only a local one, since it was carrying raisins and leather and
had
only four men attending it. One of the Muslims had his head
shaved, and this made the Meccans think they were a group performing
the 'umiah or lesser pilgrimage.
In the accounts of Ibn Ishaq and al-Waqidi, the Muslims now
found themselves faced with a problem. It was the last day of the
"sacred month" of Rajab, during which hostilities were
forbidden;
but by the following day the caravan would have entered the
"sacred territory" of Mecca, where hostilities were
equally forbidden.
They decided to attack at once. One of the Meccans was
killed by an arrow, two were taken prisoner, and one escaped to
Mecca. Despite this escape, the Muslims were able to return
safely to Medina with the prisoners and the caravan. The version
of al-Suddi, which al-Tabari gives subsequently, suggests that the
fighting occurred on the first day of Rajab. The verse of the
Qur’an quoted (2.217) makes it clear that the fighting was in
the month of Rajab, but gives no indication whether it was at the
beginning or end.
On reaching Medina safely, the members of the successful
party were surprised to find that they were not nearly so well
xxii The Foundation of the Community
received as they had expected. The ostensible reason was that they
had killed a man during a sacred month. It seems unlikely that
this weighed much with Muhammad himself, since the sacred
month was part of the false religion he was attacking. The matter
is more complex than this, however. The Qur’an itself (2.125;
3.97) acknowledges the sacredness of Meccan territory; but the
sacredness of the four months (Rajab, Dhu al-qa'dah, Dhu al-
hijjah, Muharram) may not have been acknowledged until after
the abolition of the intercalary month {nasi], usually said to be
in
the year 10/632. 8 It is almost certain, however, that the fundamental
reason for the disquiet in Medina over this matter was the
fear that it would lead to Meccan reprisals against the whole
city.
It has to be remembered that the Ansar had not taken part in any
expedition against the Meccans, but they had undertaken to protect
the Emigrants if these were attacked, and to this extent
were deeply involved in the consequences of the expedition to
Nakhlah.
The raiding party is said to have offered Muhammad a share of
the booty as chief of their tribe. The pre-Islamic custom was that
the chief should receive a quarter of any booty captured by the
tribe in order to offset what he had to expend on behalf of the
tribe. The later Islamic norm was that Muhammad received a
fifth, but it is doubtful if anything so precise had yet been decided.
Since acceptance of a share of the booty would have implied
approval of what the Muslim party had done, Muhammad at
first declined. Eventually, however, the matter was settled by a
revelation (2.217): "They ask you about the sacred month,
fighting in it;
fighting in it is a great (sin), but barring from the ways of
God, and disbelieving in him and in the sacred mosque, and expelling
its people from it, are greater (sins) in God's sight." After
this Muhammad accepted a share of the booty, presumably now
satisfied that the Ansar would support him whatever the Meccans
did. The kinsmen of the man killed would doubtless attempt
to avenge him, but the Meccans in general could not ignore the
loss of face caused by the capture of the caravan almost, as it
were, from under their noses.
8. Qur'an, 9.36L
Translator’s Foreword
xxui
The break with the Jews (1279-81)
The change of Qiblah (direction faced in prayer) and the institution
of the fast of Ramadan are not purely questions of religious
observance but are linked with political matters. M uhamma d had
from an early date become convinced that the revelations he received
were identical in essence to those which were the basis of
Judaism and Christianity; he therefore expected that the Jews of
Medina would accept him as a prophet. Consequently, when he
came to Medina, he was disappointed to find that the Jews there,
far from accepting his prophethood, were mostly inclined to
poke fun at his revelations. Only one or two formally became
Muslims.
The Muslims of Medina appear to have adopted a number of
practices from their Jewish neighbours. They kept the Jewish fast
of the 'Ashura’; most, but not all, of them faced Jerusalem in
prayer; and they made something special of the prayer at midday
on Fridays. Muhammad seems at first to have encouraged all
these practices. The Qur’an (5.5) makes it lawful for Muslims to
eat Jewish food and to marry Jewish women. After some sixteen
or eighteen months in Medina, however, it became clear to Muhammad
that such concessions were not going to win over the
Jews, and a series of events occurred to which Western scholars
have given the label of "the break with the Jews." The
two points
here mentioned by al-Tabari are central to this change, namely,
the change of Qiblah and the institution of the fast of Ramadan.
A later source has a story of how Muhammad, while leading
prayers, received a revelation bidding him face Mecca instead of
Jerusalem, upon which he and all the other participants turned
round and faced south instead of north; the place where this is
said to have happened became known as the Mosque of the Two
Qiblahs. No verse in the Qur’an exactly fits this story, and a
careful
study of the whole passage (2.142-52) suggests that there may
have been a period of uncertainty before a revelation prescribed
the new Qiblah. The date of the change of Qiblah is about 1 1 February
624.
The essential point about the fast of Ramadan is that it was to
replace the Jewish 'Ashura’, which the Muslims of Medina had
been observing before the Hijrah, and in which Muhammad and
XXIV
The Foundation of the Community
the Emigrants probably shared. The brief paragraph in al-Tabari
suggests that the fast of Ramadan was meant to celebrate the deliverance
of the Muslims at Badr just as the 'Ashura’ commemorated
the deliverance of the Israelites at the Red Sea. Although alTabari
records the institution in year 2, it seems impossible that
the Muslims could have kept the full fast in this year, since the
battle of Badr occurred on or about 19 Ramadan. It is conceivable
that some days of fasting were observed after the return to Medina,
and that this justified the celebration of the 'id al-fitr, the
feast of the breaking of the fast.
It seems likely that the events mentioned maiked not only the
rejection of Jewish practices but also some political realignments
among the Muslims. It is from about this period that we hear of
the Hypocrites, the nominal Muslims opposed to many of Muhammad's
policies. Their leader was 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy, who
had for long had close relations with some of the Jews and had
hoped they would help him to become prince of Medina. On the
other hand, Sa'd b. Mu'adh, possibly the strongest man in Medina,
now put himself wholeheartedly behind Muhammad and was instrumental
in persuading about two hundred of the Ansar to join
the expedition to Badr — the first time any of the Ansar had taken
part in an expedition. There are various small points which suggest
that Sa'd b. Mu'adh might be described as pro- Arab and anti-
Jewish. In 627 it was he who decided that all the men of the Jewish
clan of Qurayzah were to be put to death.
The battle of Badr (1279-1359)
The amount of material about the battle of Badr collected by
the historians is a mark of its importance. Perhaps its most
significant
result was the upsurge of confidence among the Muslims.
During the later years at Mecca, the Qur’anic revelations had
been showing how God protected his prophets against those who
opposed them and rejected the revelations, and how in the end
the prophets and the believers were triumphant and the opponents
were punished. The victory of Badr was the way in which
God had vindicated his prophet Muhammad against the Meccan
pagans, just as he had vindicated other prophets in other ways.
For the ordinary believer it was a powerful confirmation of Muhammad's
claim to be a prophet. The belief that God and his
Translator’s Foreword
XXV
angels worked for them during the battle raised the morale of the
Muslims to such a point that it became overconfidence.
Muhammad himself must have been deeply moved by the confirmation
of his prophethood, but he must also have been aware
that there were many problems ahead. For even if the Meccans
had lost a dozen of their most senior men, Abu Sufyan and a few
others were still around, and some capable younger men were
coming up ; so Meccan power must still be feared. Besides, in addition
to the loss of leading men there was a serious loss of pres-
tige, and prestige was necessary for the Meccans if they were to
maintain their commercial empire. They were thus bound to attempt
to reverse the result, and Muhammad must have been
aware of the fact.
With regard to the expedition itself, as previously noted, this
was the first occasion on which men of the An§ar joined Muhammad.
This doubtless came about largely because of the new
understanding between Sa'd b. Mu'adh and Muhammad. The majority
of the Ansar had probably decided to support and defend
Muhammad against any Meccan reprisals for the attack at Nakhlah.
With the contingent of Ansar the Muslim force would easily
have been strong enough to overpower the men accompanying
the caravan, and Muslim intentions probably did not go beyond
booty. Muhammad and Sa'd, however, probably realized that
things could become more serious.
The excellence of the Meccan information service is shown by
the fact that Abu Sufyan knew about the Muslim expedition to
Badr in sufficient time to take evasive action and that the people
in Mecca knew in time to send out a relief force. The possibility
of such a force may have occurred to Muhammad, but he probably
had no definite information until he was in the vicinity of
Badr. On this point the view of 'Urwah in his letter (1286) is to
be
preferred to that of Ibn Ishaq (1300). Had the Muslims in general
known earlier they might have wanted to withdraw, for it was no
dishonour to an Arab to avoid an engagement with a superior
force. At Badr, however, when the two forces found themselves so
close to one another, neither could honourably have retreated. On
the other hand, it could be argued that Qur'an 8.7 — God's promise
of one of the two companies, the caravan or the relief force —
implies that Muhammad knew something about a relief force
XXVI
The Foundation of the Community
before he knew that the caravan had eluded him. It is just conceivable,
then, that he deliberately manoeuvred the Muslims into a
situation in which they could not honourably avoid a conflict
with the Meccans.
On the Meccan side, Abu Jahl was clearly a "hawk" intent
on
teaching Muhammad a lesson and restoring Meccan prestige. It
was he who taunted with cowardice those who wanted to withdraw
while that was still an option. The right of commanding the
Meccans in war belonged to Abu Sufyan, but, because he was absent
with the caravan, Abu Jahl was temporarily in command;
and it may be that he wanted to make the most of this opportunity.
Once the Meccans realized the close proximity of the Muslims,
there could be no question of retreating.
Some reasons for the Muslim victory can be discerned. The
plan adopted by Muhammad on the suggestion of one of his followers,
namely, blocking up all the wells except one and so depriving
the Meccans of water, certainly contributed. It is likely,
too, that the Ansar, because they gained a livelihood by cultivating
date-palms and cereal crops, were in better condition physically
than the Meccans, whose lives as merchants were probably
much more sedentary. Even when they accompanied caravans,
they presumably did so on camel-back. The Ansar, moreover, had
gained experience of fighting in the feuds which had been endemic
in the oasis. Some of the Emigrants also proved successful
fighters, possibly because they were in general younger men than
their opponents, while their belief in God and in the life of Paradise
doubtless increased their confidence.
The accounts of the treatment of prisoners and other events
of the period after the battle give interesting insights into the
outlook and moral attitudes of the people of the time. The first
and lengthiest part of al-Tabari's material comes from Ibn 'Abbas
through his disciple 'Ikrimah, that is, from authorities on the
exegesis
of the Qur'an, not authorities on Muhammad's career. The
critical verse is 8.67: "It is not for any prophet to have
captives
until he has made slaughter in the land ... (or "until he has
subdued
the land")." Some of the surrounding verses belong to
the
period of the battle of Badr but others belong to that of Uhud,
and
it is difficult to distinguish the two. It seems likely that 8.67
was
not revealed until after Uhud and is perhaps part of the attempt
to
Translator’s Foreword xxvii
explain why that was so disastrous. On this assumption the verse
is saying: "If you had not been so keen on ransoms after Badr
and
had not taken prisoners, these losses would not have befallen
you." It is probably not coincidence that in some sources the
number of prisoners at Badr and the number of Muslim dead at
Uhud are both stated to be seventy. It should not be supposed,
however, that killing instead of taking prisoners was thought of
chiefly as a way of weakening the enemy militarily. It was seen
rather as inflicting a punishment and something of a moral duty,
in line with the lex talionis.
Modern Westerners are inclined to think of the principle of
"an
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" as barbaric, 9 but in
actuality
the lex talionis is a primitive way of maintaining security for
life
and property. It is indeed almost the only way of doing this when
there is no strong central authority capable of punishing wrongdoers.
The basis is the solidarity of the group of kinsmen. A person
is less likely to kill or injure another without serious cause if
he knows that the victim's kin-group will inflict a like injury on
his own kin-group. All the groups recognized that it was essential
that injuries and deaths should be avenged, and usually ended the
blood-feud when proper vengeance had been taken, though it was
sometimes difficult to agree on what was proper and equal vengeance.
This meant that the system was only effective when the
next of kin saw it as a sacred duty to avenge a death. When it became
the practice to accept a blood-wit of camels instead of a life,
the conservative moralists taunted those who did so with being
content with milk instead of blood. It is noteworthy that in al-
Tabari's second account (on page 1336) 'Umar says that the Meccans
had called Muhammad a liar and driven him out, and so
deserved to die ; and this has the implication that in not having
them put to death Muhammad was failing to perform his duty.
The expulsion of Banu Qaynuqa' (1360-2)
One of the limitations of al-Tabari's method of writing history
is to be seen in the fact that this is the first reference to the
Jews
of Medina. The title "the break with the Jews" was given
above to
the section on the change of Qiblah and the institution of the
fast
9 . Exodus 11 . 13 - 5 ; Leviticus 14 . 17 - 11 .
XXV111
The Foundation of the Community
of Ramadan, but al-Tabari himself did not mention the Jews
there. Yet from the Qur’an it is clear that the Jews were a
serious
problem for Muhammad from the day of his arrival in Medina.
From the little he knew previously about the Jewish religion, he
expected the Jews to receive him as a prophet. To the generality
of the Jews, however, it was inconceivable that there could be a
prophet who did not come from the chosen people, that is, themselves.
To make things worse for Muhammad and the Muslims,
the Jews did not merely refuse to recognize Muhammad as a
prophet but made fun of him in various ways and tried to discredit
his prophethood by showing that some of the Qur’anic assertions
about Biblical matters were incorrect.
The expulsion of the Banu Qaynuqa' is probably to be seen as a
corollary of the break with the Jews. It is possible that Muhammad
and Sa'd b. Mu'adh had agreed that they would get rid of the -
Jews as opportunities presented themselves. According to al-
Waqidi, the immediate occasion of the siege of Qaynuqa' was a
trick played by a Jew on an Arab woman as she sat in their market.
An Arab killed this Jew, and then another Jew killed the
Arab. At this, the Jews took refuge in their strongholds, and the
Muslims came and besieged them. This incident was no more
than a pretext, and by omitting it al-Tabari seems to have judged
it so. The very life of the Islamic religio-political community at
Medina depended on wholehearted belief that Muhammad was a
prophet and the Qur’an the word of God; but this belief was endangered
by some of the criticisms made by the Jews. This was
the fundamental reason for the attacks on the three main Jewish
clans in Medina and on particular individuals. Muhammad was
doubtless aware that the Jews were relatively wealthy, and the
Muslims benefited from the seizure of their wealth; but that was
not the primary reason for attacking them.
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