CONSPIRACY RISING Chapter 1 Sub bab Conspiracy Theories: Paranoid Delusion or Politically Meaningful?

CONSPIRACY RISING

Chapter 1 Sub bab

Conspiracy Theories: Paranoid Delusion

or Politically Meaningful?

It is reasonable to question why anyone would come to understand history as the product of conspiracy. An easy answer might be that those who propagate and adopt conspiracy theories are paranoid. Their beliefs are rooted in a psychological problem that marks the way in which they interpret the world. Swami et al. found in their survey of British citizens that there were several character traits that correlated positively with belief in conspiracy theories. Those related personality factors include: a cynical attitude toward politics, defiance toward politicians, support for democratic principles, and an appreciation for new and unusual ideas. The study also found conspiracy belief to be negatively correlated with agreeableness, a factor the study’s authors comment “ likely stemmed from the association between disagreeableness and suspicion and antagonism towards others.” Goertzel’s 1994 study produced similar findings, concluding that belief in conspiracies correlates with feelings ofpolitical alienation from the political system. In addition, conspiracy theories helpfully provide a host of enemies toward which believers can direct their anger, and in this way function to resolve the tension that might exist between an individual’s view of the world, and reality.

The title of Richard Hofstadter’s classic article “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” suggests that he argues that those who believe in conspiracy theories are simply irrational and suspicious. Hofstadter makes clear, however, that he is borrowing the clinical term “paranoid” for other purposes. While he argues that those who adopt conspiracy theories suffer from a deep sense of persecution, which they systematize in “grandiose theories of conspiracy,” the distinguishes between the “clinical paranoiac” and the “paranoid political spokesman.” Although they share some characteristics both are “overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic in expression” there are clear differences between them. Most notably, Hofstadter argues, the clinical paranoiac believes threats are being directed against him, but the political paranoiac believes the threats are directed against a nation, culture, and or way of life. For these reasons, political paranoiacs understand their convictions to be both unselfish and patriotic, and support them with a sense of “righteousness and moral indignation.”  

Conspiracy thinkers often fall into this second category, and it is therefore more accurate and useful to consider how and why adopting conspiracy beliefs might appeal to the political sensibilities of particular individuals. First, as noted above, part of conspiracy theory’s appeal and one of its flaws is the assumption that it is possible for human beings to make history, that is, to shape the world to their will. This way of understanding can be reassuring, for it begins with the assumption that it is possible for individuals to exercise some form of control over the world. This is also linked to the notion of identity. As James points out, where previously identity was ascribed, in modernity, we can create our own identity.

Second, through their explanation of history, conspiracy theories provide their adherents with an explanation of how and why evil is at work in the world. Rather than addressing the complexity of human existence, however, they identify good and evil in clear-cut terms, and in so doing, also divide human beings into those who are good and those who are evil. In this world, shades of gray do not exist. Flanagan notes that this dualistic way of approaching politics is useful in times of war and for populist movements aiming to take power. It clearly distinguishes between political allies and political enemies.

A third reason for the appeal of conspiracy theories lies in the security they provide to their adherents. As citizens of the modern world, we are accustomed to encountering change and crisis in our day-to-day lives. To varying degrees, we become adept at living with uncertainty. We learn to adapt to small scale personal change such as moving house or changing employment. We apprehend that at the national and international levels, change is also a constant feature of the political landscape. The events of September 11, 2001, shocked and saddened us, but it was the scope of their violence, and their implications that may have surprised us, not the fact that the nature of international politics could change. It is the case, however, that a small but significant minority of individuals do not, and perhaps cannot, adequately adapt. They are threatened by significant alterations to their lives.

In his study of conspiracy belief, Goertzel found that one factor that significantly correlated with conspiracy beliefs was concern about one’s employment security. One way in which individuals respond to these kinds of threats is to turn to belief systems that offer them comfort and security by providing an explanation for their problems and the promise that a solution exists that will allow things to be better in the future. While these types of ideologies are not always dangerous, they frequently have pathological aspects. An individual who loses his or her job and falls into this trap might be inclined to blame “immigrants swamping the job market,” and conclude that the deportation of immigrants is an appropriate solution. Very few problems in the modern world, however, have such clear explanations, and it is rare that they have a clear-cut solution. Blaming a particular group or groups for one’s own problems is a much easier intellectual enterprise than considering the ways in which forces of the global economy have transformed the employment market.

An important point of clarification here is that although conspiracy theories may at first seem to provide a very simple explanation for political events, when one considers them carefully, it becomes apparent that they often paint a picture of the world that is extremely complex. A number of conspiracy theories exist, for example, that suggest some type of international Jewish conspiracy was behind the events of September 11, 2001. One such theory claims that 4,000 Jews were warned to stay home from work on that day on the instruction of the Israeli Secret Service, a theory apparently based on a Jerusalem Postarticle that stated 4,000 Israelis were believed to have been near the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on the day of the attacks. Although this explanation appears simple, if it were true, it would rely on the collusion of over 4,000 individuals to keep the truth secret, and a vastly complex chain of power relationships. The official story is much simpler. Once again, Occam’s razor suggests the conspiracy theory is unlikely.

Groh suggests that at the level of everyday perception, it is only an individual’s “healthy common sense” that prevents him or her from adopting conspiracy theory as a mode of explanation for events. In that sense, conspiratorialists are not abnormal. Every human being might at any time be tempted to cross the line and utilize conspiracy as explanation. It is, he writes, a “permanent temptation,” and we are all potentially susceptible to such belief systems. Indeed, the leap to conspiracy theory may not be as great as we imagine.

Conspiracy theories are internally consistent, and like more scientific understandings of the world, they begin with the assumption of explicit causality. Indeed, they surpass reality in terms of their logical consistency. Individuals and events are connected in ways that are more coherent than in the real world, where errors and ambiguity exist. Nesta Webster, arguably the most influential conspiracy theorist of the 20th century, became convinced that the world was governed by conspirators while she researched the French Revolution. She argued that since it was impossible for the masses to create such an upheaval themselves, it was therefore reasonable to ask “by whom was it made?” She concluded that a Jewish  conspiracy controlling such forces as “Grand Orient Masonry, Theosophy, Pan-Germanism, International Finance, and Social Revolution” was  involved, and this conspiracy was the cause of all threats to Britain and  “Christian civilization.” Webster developed an elaborate schematic table that purported to illustrate secret links among groups as diverse as the Fenians and the British Conservative Party.

Finally, as Hofstadter remarks, it is certainly true that history has been marked by a good number of conspiratorial acts. This is because all political behavior requires strategy; strategy may depend on secrecy and anything that is secret might be described as conspiratorial. In addition, real political conspiracies have existed. The “massive campaign of political spying and sabotage” that constituted the Watergate scandal, for example, revealed the duplicity of the political leaders concerned and their capacity to engage in illegal conspiratorial behavior to accomplish their political goals. As Johnson points out, however, real conspiracies are not the rigid systems of power that conspiracy theorists believe exist. They are comprised of people, not “mindless pawns of evil.”

The Watergate conspiracy is notable, but so too is its discovery and aftermath. Individuals even those involved in illegal conspiracies often behave in unpredictable ways, and in democracies, this capacity can be fully expressed. Participants or observers to a conspiracy may decide to speak up and reveal what has happened, as Deep Throat did in the case of Watergate. In a similar vein, Aaronovitch argues that the most effective conspiracy involving the American government was the 1985–86 Iran-Contra Affair.

This conspiracy saw senior members of the Reagan administration circumvent a congressional prohibition on support for the Nicaraguan Contras by selling weapons to Iran. It was intended both to secure the release of American hostages in Iran and provide support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. The elaborate scheme unraveled, and eventually 14 people were charged in the affair. Again, reality proved too difficult to control.

Popular culture has also absorbed these ideas. From the early 1990s onward, the idea of conspiracy has featured in a variety of media. Chris Carter’s X-Filesfranchise brought conspiracy theory to American prime time television for almost 10 years, quickly becoming part of the cultural landscape. As Joyce Millman wrote for the New York Times,“It hauntingly captured the cultural moment when paranoid distrust of government spilled over from the political fringes to the mainstream, aided by the conspiracy theory disseminating capability of the Internet. With its high-level coverups, Deep Throats and adherence to the watchwords “Trust no one,” The X-Filestapped into still-fresh memories of Iran-Contra and Watergate, not to mention Ruby Ridge and Waco.” Building on a surging mistrust of government, the program followed two FBI agents, Fox Mulder and Dana Scully, as they investigated cases that involved extraterrestrial intervention in world affairs, and which seemed to suggest that a secret group of government officials and business executives were working together toward nefarious ends. Interestingly, The X-Filesis one of the fi rst appearances in popular culture of the superconspiracy form; the program’s story lines involve evidence going back in history thousands of years.

More recently, Dan Brown’s novel The Da Vinci Code and its follow-up, The Lost Symbol, have further extended the reach of conspiratorial thinking. Brown’s stories concern the adventures of Harvard symbologist Robert Langdon, whose esoteric knowledge draws him into the inner workings of the Illuminati, Freemasons, and Knights Templar, and there is no denying the books’ appeal. The DaVinci Codesold over 80 million copies worldwide, and on its fi rst day of release, The Lost Symbolwas the fastest selling adult book ever, with sales of over one million in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The books purport to reveal the hidden truths of the Knights Templar, the Freemasons, the Illuminati, and that other secret society with a worldwide reach, the Roman Catholic Church.

Dan Brown was aware he was writing fiction, but the publicity his work received, and the response of these institutions to the charges made against them by characters in the books, suggested that at least in some people’s minds, the books were either too close to the truth or a threat for other reasons. In Britain, the Catholic “DaVinci Code Response Team” commissioned a survey concerned with gauging the effect of the book. It found that of those who had read the novel, 60 percent believed that its claim that Jesus fathered a child with Mary Magdalene was true. The response by the Catholic Church in the United States was similar. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops launched the website Jesusdecoded.com to counter the book’s claims. Those with the conspiracy mind-set, however, were unlikely to be convinced—in fact, they were more likely to have their beliefs reaffirmed by such a campaign. The Da Vinci Codemovie struck a similar chord.

Dozens of other conspiracy-oriented movies have been made, in the Post Cold War, post-Watergate era, and many of them have been marked by, if not antigovernment themes, then certainly the message that one ought to be suspicious of politicians and one’s government. Barry Levinson’s Wag the Dog;Michael Mann’s The Insider;Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report Oliver Stone’s JFKand Nixon;Andy and Larry Wachowski’s The Matrix and of course, Richard Donner’s Conspiracy Theory all fall into this category. With the decline of the Soviet Union as a dependable foil for United States’ interests, one suspects, a conspiracy-minded public’s adoption of the government as the people’s enemy became a particularly appealing plot line.

Conspiracism’s infiltration of popular culture has increased familiarity with the content of specifi c conspiracy theories and arguably also increased their acceptance as a mode of political explanation. In addition, the Internet has spread conspiracy theories further and faster than ever before. Barkun argues that this method of transmission also makes them a more respectable form of explanation. Conspiracy theories were once a form of stigmatized knowledge; the larger political community marginalized them. Through the Internet, however, they have moved closer to the mainstream. With millions of pages of information and no means for its readers to distinguish between fact and fiction, the Internet blurs the line between these two realms. As a result, once stigmatized forms of knowledge may become indistinguishable from more mainstream ways of thinking.

Barkun notes that through popular culture, individuals who are inclined to think in terms of conspiracies are given further reason to do so, and through the Internet, they are provided with a smorgasbord of options as well as a means of disseminating their own views. Jodi Dean, in fact, goes so far as to suggest that conspiracy theories are a reasonable form of political expression. She argues that a shared conception of “reality” does not exist, so that conspiracy theories are perhaps plausible ways to understand the world and must be taken seriously. Thus, conspiracy is no longer part of the “lunatic fringe, but a “vehicle for political contestation.” While Dean’s arguments are interesting, this book takes the position that although conspiracy theories very often spring from legitimate political grievances and or are the result of significant political concerns, their content and structure are problematic and rarely reflect the genuine condition of political existence.

Another reason for the prevalence of conspiracy theories is that modern governments are extremely complex entities and require significant bureaucracies in order to function. The complexity of these systems can make their behavior occasionally incomprehensible to their citizens. Government policies may be influenced by specific interests and marked by contradictions. In addition, civil servants may not always effectively or consistently implement those policies. This situation lends itself to conspiratorial explanations. If one cannot understand how governmental decisions are made and policies implemented, one might assume that an elite conspiracy of individuals is indeed directing a government’s behavior, and as Hofstadter points out, in democracies, this is particularly problematic.

This possibility, coupled with high-profile political events in which government appeared ineffective (for example, Hurricane Katrina, the events of September 11, 2001, and even the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico), contributed to making conspiracy theories appear to be reasonable explanations for the government’s lack of response to the chaos of human existence.

Conspiracy theories have long been a part of American political life, but there are particular historical periods in American history when they have developed into a more signifi cant part of public discourse. The remainder of this book attempts to answer the question of why this is the case, and it explores the significance of this phenomenon. An important part of this endeavor is a consideration of the content of those beliefs. The 20th century was littered by the emergence of a multitude of single-event conspiracy theories, but the real innovation in conspiracy thinking was the rise of superconspiracies. While conspiracy thinkers had previously identified the Knights Templar, Freemasons, and Illuminati as conspirators, it is really only in the past 100 years that these three groups have found their way into the majority of modern superconspiracies. The historical record of the Templars, Freemasons, and Illuminati is enlightening, for it illustrates that these groups and their leaders are very different from the place they hold in 20th-century conspiracy theories. The distance between reality and their symbolic meaning reveals much about the appeal of modern conspiracy theories.